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The chain store has become the subject of 
considerable study in the marketing field. In 
connection with the various vieYJPointa encountered in 
this field, I have been impressed with the amount of 
bitterness I have foW1d among certain classes who are 
opposed to this type of merchandising organization. 
This phase of the subject gave me the desire to make a 
study of the attempts to legislate against the chain 
store, and to try to determine the motive behind such 
attempts, together with the probability of the success 
of these efforts. 
My study has been only of legislation and I have 
made no effort to set forth my ideas of the economic 
desi~ability of such legislation. My conclusions are 
,~nly as to the possibility of framing laws of such a 
nature that they will affect ohain stores and yet 
exempt the independent merchant. These conclusions are 
based upon decisions handed down by the courts that 
have been called upon to pass upon the constitutionality 
. of such laws when enacted. 
This work is divided into two sections. The first 
section deals with anti-chain store laws which have 
been enacted, contesting litigation on these laws. and 
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the final,disposition of them. The seoond section deals 
with bills which were·introduced in the various state 
legislatures but which failed to become laws. Especial 
attention has been paid to the bill introduced in the 
Kansas Legislature of 1931, through the attendance of 
legislative sessions and open committee meetings, and 
through discussion of the bill with many of the 
legislators who were active both for and against its 
passage. 
My information has been compiled through examination 
of the cases in law as affecting the final disposition 
of anti-chain store laws, examination of the doc'Ulllents 
of the various state legislatures, correspondence with 
the attorney-generals of the states in which anti-chain 
store laws have been passed, and correspondence with 
legal~author1ties and members of state legislatures who 
are particularly interested in this type of law. 
Certain magazine and newspaper articles have also been 
found helpful in ~e gathering of this information. 
Dean Stockton, Mr. Axe, Mr. Kissick, and Mr. 
Teviotdale, of the School of Eusinees, have given me 
very valuable aid in this work. 
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.Anti-Chain Store Legislation. 
Development of Anti-chain store legislation has held 
Lesi~l~t~on. a rather important place on the pro-
grams of many of our state legislatures sinoe 1927. 
Prior to that time little interest was shown by legis-
lative bodies in this matter. The increasing growth of 
chains in many lines of industry, together with the 
growing distress of a great many independent merchants, 
who believed the chains to be the cause of most of 
their troubles, caused a great mass of bills to be 
presented before the state legislative bodies in an 
attempt to correct the supposed evil. In 1925, only 
two such bills found their way into legislative consid-
eration and yet, in 1929 sixty-three suoh bills were 
considered. 
Three Ty;pes Most of these bills have been patterne~ 
of ~ills. along somewhat similar lines and divided 
into three types. The first of these three, and the 
one most oommon, proposes a license tax_ ~9 be levied on 
eaoh unit owned ~~ operated by the same proprietor, but 
providing exemption for the proprietor who operates a 
limited number of unite. This limit ha.a been set at 
various points; in some cases at five, in others at 
three, and in the later bills, at one. The second 
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type of anti-chain store bill is one which proposes a 
li,cense tax on each unit operated, including _the first, 
but with that tax graduated upward as the number of 
units under one proprietor increases. The third tY'Pe 
of anti-chain store bill provides a gross sales tax, 
either graduated upward with volwne of sales, or with 
an exemption for the proprietor who does a small volume 
of business. 
The Purpose of Anti-Chain 
Store Legislation~ __ 
Disregarding for the time 
the number of units neoes-
sary to constitute-a chain of stores, and remembering 
that most of the legislation is really aimed at the big, 
national chains, I find two reasons advanced for this 
type of legislation. The aims of the authors of these 
bills are; first, the regulation of the growth of 
chains of stores, and second, the raising of revenue. I 
have attempted to find which of these functions is the 
more i:rnportapt a.nd believe that there may be a differ-
enoe as to YthiQJ:i i_@ _QOJleig~e_re_d _ th,e more ).mportant~_ 
aocording to what stat~ is being considered. Some bills 
frankly state that they are intended to keep down the 
menace of ohe.in store growth in order to protect the 
independent merchant, while others olaim as their sole 
purpose the raising of revenue. The courts have deoid-
I 
ed that the public interest is not so involved as to 
cause such laws to fall within the police power and 
that they are, therefore, purely revenue measures. 
Bills That Have Three states have shown a dogged 
~ecome Laws. determination to place anti-chain store 
laws on their statute booke,_~s is shown by the fact that 
ea.ch of them has enacted ~ second -~uoh law after their 
first attempts had met with adverse juclicial action. 
These states are North Carolina, Georgia, and South 
Carolina. North Carolina and Georgia passed such laws 
in 1927 and repeated in 1929. South Carolina enacted 
her first anti-chain store law in 1928 and the second in 
1930. Pennsylvania and Maryland were apparently satisfied 
when their first laws met with judicia.l disapproval, and 
Indiana has needed no second attempt to pass a valid law. 
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Anti-Chain Store Laws of 1927. 
The First Laws 
to be Enacted. 
The first real attempt to legislate 
against chain stores came in 1927. As 
the result of legislative action of that year, five laws 
were enacted that could be classed as anti-chain store. 
The state legislatures taking this action were those of 
North Carolina, Maryl~nd, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and 
Michigan. New Mexico enacted an occupational tax law 
in 1927 which is classified Qy·some as anti-chain store 
legislation. This law does not have the oharaoteristics 
of an anti-chain store act a.nd, after studying its 
provisions, I doubt that it was intended as such by the 
New Mexico legislature. This law will be further 
considered in a section dealing with gross sales tax 
laws. The North Oaroli~a, Maryland, and Georgia laws 
were frankly anti-chain while the Pennsylvania law was 
aimed at the chains in a more roundabout manner through 
the restriction of ownership. The Miohigan law was 
drawn up in such a manner as to resemble the one passed 
in Pennsylvania, but, in the Michigan aot, the provis-
~ons were less .drastic and the law failed to draw ~he 
fire of contesting litigation. There is little doubt 
that this law was aimed at chain drug stores and as it 
stands now, the statute would prevent corporations which 
did not conduct drug stores within the state at the 
time the law was passed, from establishing stores in 
Michigan. 
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North Carolina The North Carolina law of 1927 was one 
of the first such laws to be placed on 
the statute books. It reads as follows: 
"Section 162. Branch or Chain Stores. That any person, 
firm, corporation, or association operating or main-
taining within this state, under the same general 
management, supervision or ownership, six or more 
stores or mercantile establishments, shall pay· a license 
tax of $ 50 for each such store, or mercantile establish-
ment in the state, for the privileg~ of operating or 
maintaining such stores or mercantile establis~ents~"l 
The constitutionality of this law was disputed_ by a 
group of chain stores which included the Great Atlantia 
and Pacific Tea Company, J. o. Penney Company, G. R. 
Kinney Co~pa.ny, and the L. :s. Price ?leroantile Company. 
The case was heard by the Superior Court of Wake County, 
No.rth Carolina in Great Atlantic and Paoifio Tea 
Company v. Doughton~ This oourt found the act to be 
null and void, and ordered that the monies collected 
tinder the act should be returned. ~he oaee was then 
appealed by the de-fendant to the-~ Supreme Court of North 
Carolina and was heard by that court on May 3, 1928. 
A decision was rendered by the Supreme Court on October 
10, 1928 a.nd this deoision affirmed the Judgment of the 
lower court.2 Attorneys for the chain stores contended 
1. North Carolina Public Laws 1927, Chapter 80, Sn. 162. 
, 2. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Doughton. 
196 N. C. 145; 144 S. E. 701. 
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that this law was in contravention of section 3 of 
article 5 of the Constitution, which provides that 
taxation shall be by a uniform rule. They also claimed 
the law was in violation of section l of the fourteenth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in 
that it deprived the plaintiffs of the equal protection 
of the law. The Court.upheld the-contentions of the 
plaintiffs in the following statement: 
"The classification made in, the Statute., by which a 
license tax is imposed upon retail merchants, who main-
tain or operate, under the same general management, 
supervision or ownership, six or more stores or mercan-
ti~e esta.blishments"'and by which other reta.11 merchants, 
who maintain or operate a less number Df stores or 
mercantile establishments than six are exempt from such 
a tax, cannot be held as founded upon a real and substan-
tial difference between the two classes. The classifica-
tion attempted for the purpose of imposing a license tax 
upon merchants falling within one class, and exempting 
merchants falling within the other class, is, we think, 
under the authorities, clearly arbitrary, and if enforced 
would result in depriving merehan·ts, who are within the 
first class, of the equal protection of the laws of this 
State. It is immaterial that persons, firms, corporations 
or associations, liable under the terms of-the statute 
for a license tax, are designated therein as owners of 
chain stores. Their business differs from the business 
of other merchants, not taxed by the statute, only in 
matters of detail ·and methods of buying and selling 
merchandise. No question of public policy with reference 
to chain stores is presented on this record. The 
statute whose validity is challenged by the plaintiffs, 
was enacted by the General Assembly solely for the 
purpose of raising revenue; it is so admitted by the 
parties to this action; there is no suggestion in the 
statute, or upon the facts d.isclosed at the trial to the 
contrary. The license tax imposed by this statute and 
paid by the plaintiffs, who wider the admitted facts are 
included within the class made liable for a license tax, 
is illegal, for the reasons that the statute is in 
violation of the Constitution, both of this State and of 
the United States."3 . 
3. Great Atlantic end Pacific Tea Company v. Doughton. 
144 S. E. 701. Page 705. 
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The Maryland The 1927 Maryland law was the most 
Law of 1927. . drastic of any of the acts of 1927 
direote~ against chain stores. Thie law applied only 
to Allegany County, in which Cumberland is located. The 
law was as follows: 
"Section l. Be-it enacted by the General Assembly of 
Maryland, That on and after June·1, 1927, it shall be 
unlawful within Allegany County, Maryland, for any 
person, firm, assooiation, or corporation, its servants 
or agents to establish, own, operate, set-up or cause 
to be established, owned or operated either directly or 
indirectly, wider trade name for the sale of any brand 
of goods, wares, merchandise, more than five mercantile 
or other stores for the sale of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, commonly, known as chain store or chain stores 
for the sale or retail of any goods, wares, or 
merchandise; any person, firm, association, or corpor-
ation, its offic~rs, agents, consignees or servants 
violating the prov,isions of this Section shall be deed-
ed guilty or- a mis;~emeanor upon conviction before the 
Circuit Court of Allegany County, and shall be fined 
not less than Five.1 Hundred($ 5'00.00)Dolla.rs for each 
and every offense, all fines imposed under this section 
shall be paid over to the County Commissioners of 
Allegany County for the use of the public school system 
of Allegany County. 
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That in addition 
to the license fees now imposed in Allegany County 
under general or local laws against the person, firm, 
or corporation set forth in Section l, before said 
person, firm, or corporation mentioned in the preceding 
section and the limitations therein contained shall 
own, operate, or maintain any of ·said chain stores in 
Allegany County they shall first obtain from the Clerk 
of the Circuit Court for Allegany County a special 
license to be known as a chain store license and pay to 
said Clerk of the Court for each and every chain store 
operated by said individual, firm, or corporation, the 
sum of Five Hundred($ 500.oo)Dollars per year, which 
said license shall be payable to and collected by the 
Clerk of the Circui·~ Court for Allegany CoWlty for the 
use of the County Commissioners of Allegany County in 
the same manner and form as traders• licenses are now 
issued, collected and payable. Any person, firm, 
association, or corporation owning and operating said 
chain store or stores in Allegany County, Maryland, 
after Jwie l, 1927, shall 'be deemed guilty of a 
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misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof by the Circuit 
Court of Allegany County shall in addition to said 
license fee herein stipulated to be paid be fined not 
less than Five Hundred($ 500.00)Dollara for each and 
ev~ry offense, said fine to be paid to the County 
Commissioners of Allegany County for the use of the 
public sehool system of Allegany County. 0 4 
The constitutionality of this law was argued before 
Judge Doub, of the Circuit Court of All~gany County, 
Maryland, on April 21, 1928. The Keystone Grocery and 
Tea Company was the plaintiff but this company was 
aided in the oase by several other chain organizations. 
Judge Doub granted a permanent injunction against the 
enforcement of this-law on the grounds that it violated 
the Fourteenth .Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. Judge Doub said, "The Legislature may 
not, 1ll:'lder the guise of protecting the public interests, 
arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose 
unusual or unnecessary restrictions upon lawful 
occupations". He also saio., "Classes oannot be made'', 
and "Equal protection is guaranteed".5 
The Georgia The 1927 Georgia law is found in paragraph 
1'.!:."! of 192Z!ll 10-9 of the General Tax Act, Georgia Laws 
1927. It reads ae follow~: 
"Upon every person, firm or corporation o'Wlling, operat-
T~~~· maintaining or controlling a chain of stores 
' -~l.i. 
~ 
- 4." Laws of Maryland 1927, Chapter 5'54, Page 1129. 
'· Louis K. Liggett v. Baldrid.ge. 49 S Ct. ')7. Page ;'9. 
11 
eonsieting of· more· ·than five stores, the -sum of $ 25'0 
for each store in excess of five. •Chain of Stores' as 
used herein shall mean and include five or more stores 
owned, operated, maintained or controlled by the same 
firm, person or corporation in which goods, wares or 
merchandise of any kind are sold at retail in the 
State of Georgia.. Provided, that the provisions of 
this paragraph shall apply to wholesale chain-stores as 
well as retail chain-stores, and in no event shall be 
construed to apply to persons, firms, or corporations 
engaged in the sale of gasoline, motor-oils, and 
kindred lines when not sold in grocery stores."6 
An injunction was granted against the enforcement of 
this law by the Superior Court of Fulton County in 
January 1928, in Woolworth v. Harrison~ No appeal was 
taken from this decieio~·and this section of the law 
I \ 
was amended by the 1929 legislature.7 
The Pennsylvania 
J.iaw of 1927. 
tory Act of 1917. 
The 1927 Pennsylvania law is a 
supplement to the Pharmacy Regula-
. u 
It was signed by the Governor of the 
l 
state on May 13, 1927. This law makes no reference to 
chain stores, but strikes at corporation owned drug 
stores through the restriction of. drug store ownership 
to licensed pharmacists. The law reads as follows: 
0 section l. Ee it enacted, &o., That every pharmacy or 
drug store shall be owned only by a licensed pharmacist, 
and no corporation, association or copartnership shall 
own a pharmacy or drug store. unless all the partners 
or members thereof are licensed pharmacists; except _-.,;.._ 
that any corporation organized and existing under the 
laws of the Commonwealth or of any other state of the 
6. Georgia Laws 1927. General Tax Act. Paragraph 109. 
7. South Carolina House Bill No. 903. 1929. 
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United States, and authorized to do business in the 
Commonwealth, and empowered by its charter to own and 
conduct pharmacies or drug stores, and any association 
or oopartnership which at the time of the passage of 
this act, still owns and conducts a registered pharmacy 
or pharmacies or a drug store or drug stores in the 
Commonwealth, may continue to own and conduct the same: 
but no other or additional pharmacies or drug stores 
shall be established, owned, or conducted by such 
corporation, association or oopartnerehip, unless all 
the members or partners thereof are registered 
pharmacists; but any such corporation, association or 
copartnerehip, which shall not continue to O'Wll at least 
one of the pharmacies or drug stores theretofore owned 
by it, or ceases to be actively engaged in the conduct 
of a pharmacy, shall not be permitted thereafter to own 
a pharmacy or a drug store, unless all of its partners 
or members are registered pharmacists; and except that 
any person, not a licensed pharmacist, who, at the time 
of the passage of this act, owns a pharmacy or a drug 
store in the Commonwealth, may continue to own and 
conduct the esme, but shall not establish or own any 
additional pharmacy or drug store, or. if he or she· 
ceases to operate such pharmacy or drug store, shall 
not thereafter own a pharmacy or drug store, unless he 
or she be aregistered pharmacist; and except that the 
administrator, executor, or trustee of the estate of any 
deceased owner of a registered pharmacy or drug store, 
may continue to own arid conduct such pharmacy or drug 
store during tha period necessary for the settlement 
of the esta.te."ts 
The Louis:K. Liggett Company asked that an injunction 
be granted, restraining the enforcement of this act but 
the court, consisting of three federal judges, refused 
to grant the plea. •The statute was held constitutional 
upon the ground that there was a substantial relation 
to the public interest in the ownership of a drug store 
'Vlhere prescriptions were compounded. In support of this 
conclusion, the Court said that medicines must be in the 
8. General Assembly of Pennsylvania of 1929. Act No. 491. 
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store before they can be dispensed; that what is there 
is dictated not by the judgment of the pharmacist but by 
those who have the financial control of the bus·inees; 
tha.t the legislature may have thought that a corporate 
owner in purchasing drugs might give greater regard to 
price than to quality, and that if such was the thought 
of the legislature the court would not undertake to say 
that it was not without a valid connection with the 
public interest and so wireasonable as to render the 
statute invalid~ 0 9 
The plaintiff, the Louis K. Liggett Company, appealed 
the case direct to the Supreme Court of the United States 
and that court reversed the decision of the lower court. 
A part of the Court's opinion as delivered by Mr. Justice 
Sutherland follows: 
"The claim that mere oVltlerahip of a drug store by one not 
a pharmacist bears a reasonable relation to the public 
health, finally rests upon conjecture, unsupported by 
anything of substance.. Thie is not enough; and it 
becomes our duty to decla.re--the act assailed to be 
unconstitutional as in contravention of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth .Amendment.nlO 
i·o. Louis K. Liggett Company v. :Baldridge, 49 S Ct. 60. 
9. Chain Sto~e Age. January 1929. Page 32. 
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The Michigan The 1927 Michigan law was aimed at chain 
\ 
Law of 1927~ drug stores. It ie found in Michigan 
Public Aats, 1927. T~is law reads as fol~ows: 
nseoti.on l. Every phar.macy, drug store or apothecary 
shop shall be owned by a registered pharmacist and no 
partnership or corporation shall own a drug-store, 
pharmacy or apothecary shop unless at least twenty five 
per cent of-all stock is held by registered pharmacists, 
except that any corporation, organized and existing 
under the laws of the state of Michigan and empowered 
by its charter to own and conduct pharmacies, drug 
stores or apothecary shops and which, at the time of 
the passage of this act, owns and conducts a drug store 
or stores, pharmacy er pharmacies, apothecary shop or 
shops in the state of Michigan may continue to own and 
conduct the same and may establish and .own additional 
pharmacies, drug stores or apothecary shops in accordance 
with the previsions of this article: Provided, that any 
such corporation which shall not continue to own at 
~ least one of the pharmacies, drug stores or apothecary 
shops theretofore owned by it, or ceases to be actively 
engaged in the practice of pharmacy in the state of 
Michigan, shall not be permitted thereafter to own a 
drug store, pharmacy or apothecary shop: And provided 
further, That any person not a registered pharmacist who 
at the time of the passage of this act owne a pharmacy, 
drug store or apothecary shop in the state of Michigan, 
may continue to own and conduct the same in accordance 
with existing laws and regulations: And provided 
further, That the administrator, executor, or trustee 
of the estate of any deceased owner of a pharmacy, drug 
store or apothecary shop, or the widow, heirs or next 
of kin of such deceased owner, may continue to own and 
conduct such pharmacy, drug store or apothecary shop in 
accordance with existing laws and regulations. 0 11 
-Thie law resembles the Pennsylvania anti-chain drug 
store law but is so modified in its provisions that it 
has never been tested in the courts. The law, as it 
now stands, has no effect upon those firms which owned 
ll. Michigan Public Acta, 1927. Number 35'9. -... 
drug stores in Miohig~ at the time of the passage of 
the act, but it serves as a bar to the establishment of 
stores in the state by any corporation which did not 
operate stores. in the state when the law was passed. 
"This act has not been amended, repealed or pa.seed 
upon by the Supreme Court of Michigan. 1112 
The New Mexico 
Laiw of 1927~ 
While the New Mexico occupational tax 
law is sometimes classed with anti-
chain legislation, I see little reason to consider it 
as such. This law does not actually tax anything, but 
merely makes possible the levying of a tax by the 
governing bodies of towns and cities. The law provides 
that go.verning bodies of towns and cities shall have 
power to impose an occupational tax on almost every 
type of business in existence. The enumeration of the 
various occupations which, may fall under this tax is 
made in section 1 of the law. Section 5 is as follows: 
"In the case of occupational taxes assessed under 
section l of this act, such tax shall not exceed one· 
dollar per annum for each one thousand dollars gross 
volume of business done except that a minimum tax of' 
five dollars may be levied hereunder and collected."13 
In correspondence concerning this law, Mr. E. K. Neumann, 
Attorney General. of the State of New Mexico, makes the 
:f'ollowt_~g __ statement: "I might say that nearly every 
lg. Paul W. Voorhies, Attorney General, State Q:(_Miohigan. 
13. New Mexico House Bill No. 185. 1927. 
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incorporated city, town and village in the state bas 
imp~sed such a tax and is aolleoting sam.e, at least in 
so far as it is humanly possible. In theory, of course; 
this tax is a regulatory one as well as a revenue 
raising measure, tho the latter is the most important 
from the municipality's standpoint, and I am afraid 
that the regulatory feature is almost lost sight o·r. "14 
Final Disposition Of the six laws passed by the legis-
of the 1927 Laws .• _ _ latures of 1927, which have been-
looked upon as anti-chain store measures, four were 
declared invalid15 by the courts and these four were 
the ones which were undoubtedly anti-chain in their 
provisions. The Michigan act remains a law, together 
with the New Mexico occupational tax act. The Michigan 
act was certainly aimed at chain drug stores but is so 
harmless as to fail to precipitate a legal battle. I 
believe this act could be defeated in the courts on 
the same ground as was the Pennsylvania anti-chain drug 
store law, namely, t~t mere ownership does not bear a 
reasonable rela.tion to the public.\, heal th. '!'he New 
Mexico occupational tax act would, no doubt, stand the 
test of constitutionality. 
14. E. K. Neumann, Attorney General, S~ate of New Mexico •. 
Anti-Chain· Store Law of 1928. 
south Carolina While a majority of the state legie-
Law of 1928~. latures were idle during the year 1928, 
south· Carolina kept the chain store issue before the 
public with her chain store license tax. This law was 
as follows: 
8 Act 574. Section 24. Tax levied on mercantile estab-
lishments. That any person, firm, corporation or 
association operating or maintaining within this State, 
tmder the same general management, supervision, or 
ownership, five (5) or more stores or mercantile 
establishments, shall pay an annual. license tax of On~ 
Hundred($ 100.00)Dollare, in addition to all other 
license fees or charges, for each store, or mercantile 
establishment in the State, for the privilege of operat-
ing or maintaining such stores or mercantile establish-
ments: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph 
shall not apply to persons, firms or corporations 
engaged in the selling of gasoline, motor oils and 
kindred fuels when not sold in grooery stores: Provided, 
further, That the tax herein provided shall apply to 
any person, firm or oorporation which is controlled or 
held with four or more otherv by majority stock owner-
ship or ultimately controlled or directed by 011e 
management or association of ultimate management: 
Provided, further, That every foreign corporation 
engaged in the chain store business upon the expiration 
of their current license, and/or upon taking out the 
first license to do business in this State, shall as a 
further condition for the privilege of coming into this 
state and doing business herein and when such chain 
store has five (5) or more stores within or without 
this State, pay to the South Carolina Tax Commission in 
addition to all other licenses and fees charged against 
them or it, an annual license tax of One Hundred($ 100.) 
Dollars for eaQh separate st~re conducted, operated or 
established in·. ~his State. nl .. 
16. Acts South Carolina 1928. Page 1138. 
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"The 1928 South Carolina law was declared unconstitu-
tional by the Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, 
' South Carolina on-February 27, 1929, in the case of 
18 
Southern Grocery Stores v. Query et al. No appeal was 
ta.ken from this decision. 0 17 
Some eighteen state legislatures were in session in 
1928 and of these, eight proposed anti-ohain store laws. 
The South Carolina bill was the only one of this group 
to be enacted into law and it can be placed with the 
1927 laws as one of the· early experiments of the 
legislatures with this type of law. With a legal battle 
being waged to determine the constitutionality of the 
1927 anti-chain store laws of Georgia, North Carolina, 
Maryland, and PennsylvaniEi', most of the legislative 
bodies were content to await the outcome of these 
contests before enacting laws of an anti-chain store 
nature. 
17. 
E. w. Simms, Legal ~epartment, National Chain Store 
Association. 
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Anti-Chain Store Laws of ·1929. 
Much Legislative The year 1929 saw great activity in 
the field of anti-chain store 
legislation. Most of the state legislatures were in 
session and some sixty-three bills were introduced in 
attempts to legislate-against the ohain store. Of this 
great mass of bills, only three became laws and two of 
these were the products of legislatures which had pass-
ed such laws in 1927, onl.y to have them made ineffective 
by judicial decision. These two laws were enacted in 
Georgia and North Carolina. Indiana entered the field 
of anti-chain store legislation in 1929 with a license 
tax act which was unfavorable to the chain stores. The 
South Carolina legislature repealed the anti-chain store 
law it had enacted in 1928 and which had been found to 
be unconstitutiona1.l8 
The Georgia The 1929 Georgia law is a mo'dification of 
].,aw of 19?.2• the 1927 law and was enacted as an 
amendment to that law. It is found in Parag.raph 109 
of the General Tax Act and reads as follows: 
"Paragraph 109. Cha.in Stores. Under the·polioe power 
of this State, the bueinesetof conducting chain stores 
and/or a chain of stores; for the selling of any kind 
of merchandise, hereby is classified as a business 
tending to foster monopoly; and there is hereby levied 
18. South Carolina House Bill No. 903. 1929. 
upon each and every such person, firm or corporation, 
owning, operating, maintaining or controlling a chain 
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of stores, consisting of.more than five stores, the sum 
of $ ;o for eaoh store. 'Chain Of Stores' as used 
herein shall mean and include five or more stores, 
owned, operated, maintained or controlled by the same 
firm, person or corporation, in which goods, wares, or 
merchandise of any kind are sold at re'tail in the State 
of Georgia. Provided, that the provisions of this 
paragraph shall apply to wholesale chain stores, and/or 
chain~ of stores as well as to-retail chain stores; and · 
provided further, that this tax shall apply to eaoh and 
every. chain of stores as herein defined, and said tax 
shall ~e paid by each store in any given chain, whether 
the same be owned, operated, and controlled by any 
person, firm, or corporation, or by any holding company 
or trustee, who holds the title and/or beneficial 
interest in the same. or in any units in any chains of 
stores, to and for the use and benefit of the owners of 
the entire ohain of stores, or of any Wlit or units in 
the same.nl9 
~ 
Thi~ law differs from the 1927 Georgia law in three 
ways. The bill attempts to make a legal ground for 
enforo~ing the law by specifying that this enforcement 
should oome under the police power; the license tax was 
reduced from two~~undred-fifty dollars in the 1927 law 
to fifty dollars in the 1929 law; and ~e 1929 law 
makes no attempt to exempt gasoline filling stations, 
while such stations were pointed out for exemption in 
the 1927 law. The F. w. Woolworth Company and others 
asked that an injunction be granted against the enforce-
ment of this law but this action was dismissed in the 
Superior Court of Fulton County, on a demurrer by the 
state. An appeal was made to the Supreme Court of the 
19. General Tax Aot of Georgia. Page 109. 
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state and that Court held that the ,law was discrimina-
tory, and t.b.erefore unconstitutiona1.20 This decision 
was handed down on February 12, 1931. The finding of 
the Co~rt was as follows: 
"Under the above construction, the classification 
attempted to be made is founded on the difference 
between one who owns or operates more than five stores 
on the one hand, and one who operates five or less on 
the other, the act imposing tax on one operating six 
stores or more, and refusing to tax one who operates 
five or less stores. Such classification is arbitrary 
and unreasonable and is void because it is in conflict 
with article 7, of the Constitution of Georgia, Article 
l of the Constitution of Georgia and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.n2l 
"Another plaintiff operating five stores asked relief 
from the tax on,the ground that it applied only to 
chains operating more than five· stores. The terminology 
of the law itself was ambiguous, bu~ the court, ruling 
for the plaintiff. held the interpretation giving the 
taxpayers the greatest protection must be taken.tt22 
This ruling wae made in the case of Mystyle Hosiery 
Shope Inc. v. Harrisqn.23 This case was appeal~ed f'rom 
20 •. F. 'W. Woolworth Co. et al., v. Harrison, i;6· s. ~. 904. 
21, Ibid. Page 905. 
22. Journal of Commerce. Feb.~ 21, 1931. Page 9. 
23. ·Mystyle Hosiery Shops Ina. v. Harrison. 15' s. E. 765. 
the Superior Court of Fulton Ooun-ty, to the supreme 
Court of Georgia after the lower court had decided 
against the plaintiff. 
22. 
North Carolina The North Carolina law of 1929 is now 
¥' 
Law of 1929. before the U~ited States Supreme Court 
for final disposition. ~his law was upheld·by the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina.24 It is very similar 
to the North Carolina law of 1927 but was moditied to 
meet what seemed to be the criticism of the court in 
declaring against the earlier act. The 1929 law reads 
as follows: 
"Every person, firm or corporation engaged in the 
business of operating or maintaining, in this state under 
the S81lle general management, supervision or ownership, 
two or more stores or mercantile es~ablisbments where 
goods, wares and/or merchandise is sold or offered for 
sale at retail shall be deemed a branch or chain store 
operator; Shall apply for and obtain from the . 
commissioner of revenue a state license for the privi-
lege of engaging in such business of a branoh or chain 
store operator, and shall pay for such license fifty . ,, 
dollars on each and every such store operated in thi·s 
state in excess of one."2' 
The validity of this-act was attacked by the Great 
,Atlantia and Pacific-Tea Company. Judge R. A. Nunn of 
the Superior Court of Wake Oo,unty, - North Carolina upheld 
as valid and oonstitµtional, this law. The case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court ot North Carolina and 
that court affirmed the decision of the lower court in 
24. Great Atlantia and Pacific Tea Company v. •ax.well, 
154 S. E. 838; 199 N. C. 433. 
25. North Carolina Public Laws 1929. Section 162, Ch. 345. 
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a ruling handed down September 17, 1930. In handing 
down the decision in this case, an explanation of the 
difference between this law and the one of 1927 was 
made by the oourt in the following statement: "A 
comparison of the-statute involved in this action with 
that which we held void and unconstitutional in Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Doughton, 196 N. c. 
145; 144 s. E. 701, will disclose, we think, a vital 
and essential distinction between the two statutes. The 
tax imposed by section 162, chapter 80, Public Laws 
1927, was not levied on chain-- store operators, per se, 
as is the case in section 162, chapter 34,, Public Laws 
1929. In the former statute, the license was required, 
and the tax imposed upon every person, firm or corpor-
ation engaged in the business of maintaining and operat-
ing six or more stores, wi..th..- an exemption :from any tax 
of those who maintain.ed and operated five or less stores. 
In the latter statute there is no exemption and no 
•retroactive tax•. The tax is so imposed that merchants 
who are classified as branch or chain store operators 
are on an equality with respect to one store, with 
merchants who are not branch or chain store operators. 
Here is no discrimination, which as Clarkson, ~., says 
in his concurring opinion in Tea Company v~ Doughton, 
supra, is the vice of the former statute. In the latter 
statute the olassifio~tion is made and the tax imposed 
24 
in accordance with the value of the privilege obtained 
by the license."26 This oase has been appealed and is 
now on the docket of the United States Supreme Court 
for argument and will probably be heard in the 
October 1931 term.27 
26. Great Atlantic and Pacific· Tea Company v. Max.well, 
154 S. E. 838; 199 N. C. 433. 
27. ~. w. Simms, Legal Department, National Chain Store 
Association. 
The United States Supreme Court 
Upholds 1929 Law. 
The Indiana The Indiana law of 1929 holds a position 
~aw of 1~22. of high interest in the field of anti-
chain store legislation because of its having been 
approved by the United States Supreme Court as being 
constitutional and valid. This law differed from the 
Georgia and North Carolina laws of 1929 in that it 
attempted to meet the classification criticism by 
requiring eaoh store to procure a licen.se. The cha.in 
store was then made to carry a higher tax because this 
l 
license fee was graduated upward as the number of stores 
under one management increased. The first part of the 
act provides- for the method of collecting the tax. The 
schedule of license fees is found in section 5. This 
seotion reads as follows: 
"Section 5. Every person, firm, _corporation, association 
or copartnership opening, establishing, operating or 
maintaining one or more stores or merca.i1tile establish-
ments, within this state, under the same general 
~anagement, supervision or ownership, shall pay the 
license tees hereinafter prescribed for the privilege 
ot opening, establishing, operating or maintaini'1lg such 
stores or mercantile establishments.. The· 1icense-"t'ee 
herein prescribed shall be paid annually and shall be 
itt addition to the filing fees prescribed in sections 
2 and 4 of this act. 
The license fees herein prescribed shall be as 
follows: 
1. Upon one store, the annual license fee shall be 
three dollars for each such store. 
2. Upon two stores or more, but not to exceed five 
stores, the annual license fee shall be ten dollars for 
each such additional store. 
3. Upon each store in excess of five, but not to 
exceed ten, the annual-license fee shall be fifteen 
dollars for each such additional store. 
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4. Upon each store in excess of ten, but not to 
exceed twenty, the annual license fee shall be twenty 
dollars for each such additional store. 
5. Upon each store in excess of twenty,_ the annual 
license fee shall b~ twenty-five dollars for each 
additional store ... 2c 
Section 8 of this act defines a store as follows: 
"The term •store' as used in this act shall be construed 
to mean and include any store or stores or any mercan-
tile establishment or establishments which are owned, 
operated, maintained or controlled by the same person, 
firm, corporation, copartnership or association, either 
domestic or foreign, in which goods, wares, or merchan-
dise of any kind, are sold, either at retail or 
wholesale.•• 
The validity of the Indiana law of 1929 was challenged 
by Lafayette A. Jackson, owner of the Standard Grocery 
Company, an organization operating two hundred and 
twenty-five stores, all situated in the city of 
Indianapolis. The case was considered by Circuit Court 
Judge Sparks and District Court Judges Baltzell and 
Slick, in the District Court of the United States for 
the Southern District of Indiana. The Court found the 
"act in question is void and in violation of both the 
Constitution of the United States and the State of 
Indiana•, and directed_ that a permanent injunction be 
issued in aooorda.noe with this opinion.29 
28. Indiana Acts 1929. Chapter 207, Page 693. 
29. Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners., 
38 Federal, 2 nd. , 652., · 
Parts of the text of the decision follow: 
"The validity of the classification, as provided in 
Section 5 of the aot in question, fixing the license 
fees to be paid by plaintiff and other owners and 
operators of stores or mercantile establishments within 
the State of Indiana, presents the main question to be 
determined by this court." 
"Authority is given the State to enact laws which may 
be enforced in the exercise of its police power. The 
aot in question cannot be sustained, however, upon that 
theory. It does not relate to the public health, the 
public welfare, the public morals or the public safety. 
?f sustained, it must be solely as a revenue measure." 
"Such fees are considered revenue and are collected by 
virtue of the laws oonf erring upon the State the power 
to tax its citizens for the purpose of raising revenue 
to support its institutions and otherwise defray the 
expenses and pay the indebtedness of such state. The 
legislature may classify propertfy and occupations for 
this purpose. It may even select some property or 
occupation for taxation and omit others, so long as. 
such classification is reasonable and not arbitrary." 
"It cannot arbitrarily select a certain class of persons 
for taxation and justify its acts by calling it 
classification." 
"All persons engaged in the operation of one or more 
stores or mercantile establishments within the State 
of Indiana belong to the same class, for occupational 
purposes, as plaintiff, and should pay the same 
28 
license fee, regardless of the number of stores owned 
and operated by them. Any other classification is arbi-
trary and is in violation of the constitutional rights 
of the plaintiff. 0 30 
This Case Carried to The Indiana Board of Tax 
the Supreme Court of Commissioners carried this case 
The United States. to the United States Supreme 
Court on an appeal. The oae·e was argued before that 
Court on March 5, 1931 and a decision was handed down 
on May 18. 1931. This decision reversed the judgment 
of the District Court and held the law in question to 
be constitutional and valid.31 In reviewing the case, 
Mr. Justice Roberts in delivering the opinion of the 
Court says: "The bill charges that the graduation of 
the tax per store according to the number of stores 
under a single ownership and management is based on no 
real diff erenoe between a store part of euoh a group 
and one individually and separately owned and operated, 
or between the business transacted in them; that the 
nwp.ber of stores conducted by one person bears no 
30. Jackson v. State Eoard of Tax Commissioners, 
38 Federal, 2nd., 6~2. 
31. Decision No. 183, October Term, 1930. ~ay 18, 1931. 
Citation not yet available. 
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relation to the public health, welfare, or s~fety, none 
to the size of the enterprise as a whole, to its capital, 
its earnings or its value; that the classification made 
by the statute is without basis in fact, is unreasonable 
and arbitrary, and results in dep~iving him of his 
property without due process, and.denying him the equal 
protection of the laws. 
In the court below appellants def ended on the 
grounds that the statute was an exercise of the police 
power and was also a revenue measure which lev.ied an 
ordinary occupation tax. They otf ered no evidence to 
sustain the first ground mentioned, and do not press it 
here. They now stand only upon the power of the 
legislature in prescribing an occupation tax, to 
classify businesses, so long as its action is not 
unreasonable and arbitrary. They say that the act ful-
fills the constitutional requirement that, in so 
classifying,, the law-making body shall apply the same 
means and methods to all persons of the same class, so 
that the law will operate equally and uniformly, and 
all similarly oirourn.sta.noed will be treated alike. The 
District Court held that the statute failed to oonform 
to th1 s standard. " 
The opinion of the Court then continues: 
"The act a.dopte a. different measure of taxation for 
stores known as chain stores, from that applied to 
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those O~'lled and operated ae individual units. Evidence 
was offered by the appellee intended to demonstrate 
that there are no substantial or significant differences 
between the business and operation of the two kinds of 
stores, such as would justify the olaseification, and 
by the appellants to prove the existence of such 
differences." 
"The record show that the chain s~ore has many features 
and advantages which definitely distinguish it from the 
individual store dealing in the same oommod&tiee. With 
respect to associations of individual stores for pur-
poses of cooperative buying, exchange of ideas ae to 
advert1.sing, sales methods, etc., it need only be 
remarked that these are voluntary groups, and that 
series of independent units cannot, in the nature of 
things, be as efficiently and eucceeafully integrated 
as a chain under a. single ownership and management." 
"The principles ~hich govern the decision of this case 
are well settled. The power of taxation is fundamental 
to the very existence of the government of the states. -
The restriction that it _shall not be so exercised as to 
deny to any the equal protection of the laws does not 
compel the adoption of an iron rule of equal taxation, 
nor prevent variety or differences in taxation, or 
discretion in the selection of subjects, or the classi-
fication for taxation of properties, businesses, trades, 
callings, or occupations •••• The fact that a statute 
discriminates in favor of a certain class does not 
make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded 
upon a reasonable distinction. 11 
31. 
"It is not the function of this Court in oases like the 
present to consider the propriety or justness of the tax, 
to seek for the motives or to criticize the public 
policy which prompted the adoption of the legislation. 
Our duty is to sustain the classification adopted by the 
legislature if there are substantial differences between 
the ocoupations'separately classified. Such differences 
need not be great." 
"In view of the numerous distinctions above pointed out 
between the business of a chain store and other types 
of stores, we cannot pronounce the classification made 
by the statute to be arbitrary and unreasonable. That 
there are diff erenoes and advantages in favor of the 
chain store is shown by the number of such chains 
established and by their astonishing growth. More and 
more persons, like the appellee, have found advantages 
in this method of merchandising and have therefore 
adopted it. What was said in Metropolis Theatre Co. 
v. Chicaso, suRraL ~s quite ~pplicable here: 
" ••• The distinction obtains in every large city of 
the oou11t~y. The reason for it must therefore be sub-
stantial, and if it be so universal in the practice of 
the business it would seem not unreasonable if it be 
adopted. as the basis of governmental action." 
The Dissentin_s Parts of the dissenting opinion as 
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ppinioj!. given by :Mr. Justice Sutherland. follow: 
"Upon the face of the statute the sole differentiation 
on which the graduated and rapidly moWlting license tees 
depend consists in the number of stores operated. But 
the tax is imposed in respect of a single 'store•, 
without regard to kind, value, size, amount invested, 
amount or character of business done, -income derived, 
or other distinguishing feature. The number of stores 
is a collateral oirc"Umstance used only to determine the 
amount of the license fee to·be exacted in respect to 
each of them. A retailer pays the same as a wholesaler: 
the owner of a small corner grocery, operated by him 
alone, the same as the oMJ.er of ·a. large department 
store employing hundreds -·of clerks. • • • :tt is 
settled that the power of· the state to classify for 
purposes of taxation is of wide rang~ and flexibility; 
but that, while the difference upon which the claseifi-
ca ti'n is based need not be great, mere difference is 
not enough. Classificatio:n, to be legitimate, must 
rest upon some growid of diff erenoe having. a reasonable 
and just relation to the object of the legislation. All 
persons similarly circumstanced must be treated alike. 
• • • I am unable to find in any of these circum.etanoes, 
or in all of them together, justification for a 
classification which results '1n distributing the 
burden of taxation with such evident inequality. 
• • • A classification comparable in principle would 
be to make the amount of an income tax depend upon the 
number of sources from which the income is derived, 
without regard to the character of the sources or the 
amoW'lt of the income itself. • •• I am unable to 
discover in any of the prior decisions of this court, 
including those cited, anything, which in the light of 
the facts and circumstances herein set forth, lends 
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support to the claim of validity for the classification 
here under consideration. • •• It may be that here 
the maximum tax of. $ 25 for each store, while relative-
ly high, is not, if considered by itself, excessive; 
but to sustain it will open the door of opportunity to 
the state te increase the amount to an oppressive 
extent. Thie court frequently has-said, and it cannot. 
be too often repeated in cases of this-character, that 
the power to tax ie the power to destroy; and this 
constitutes a reason why that power, however moderately 
exercised in given instances, should be jealeusly 
confined to the limits set by the constitution. 0 32 
32. All of these quotations are taken directly from a 
photostatic copy qf the decision in this C'ase, a.e 
furnished#me by the West Publishing Company of 
St. Paul, Minnesota on May 20, 1931. 
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The Indiana case is settled and a pattern has been set 
after which chain store license laws can be drawn. 
The eoonomio side of the question was considered quite 
fully in both the decision a.nd the dissenting opinion 
and it is apparent that the final decision was made on 
the ground of ability to pay. The law, as enacted, is 
not severe enough to be damaging to anyone. It 
certainly cannot be ,called a regulatory measure but is 
strictly a revenue raising measure. I am not at all 
certain, however, that this will be the case with other 
laws which will be dravm to resemble this one. I see 
nothing to prevent the legislatures of the different 
states from introducing bills with scales of license 
fees graduated much more rapidly than the scale in the 
Indiana law. If this should be the case arid if the 
Court continues to hold that equal treatment is being 
given with a scale of this kind, this type of law could 
be made not only regulatory, but also prohibitive. 
There is much truth in the warning of Justice 
Sutherland that "to sustain it will open the door of 
opportunity to the state to increase the amount to an 
oppressive extent. 0 33 
33. Justice Sutherland in hie dissenting opinion. 
Present Status of 
jihe 19 2-9 Laws.• _ 
The 1929 Indiana law has been 
approved by the United States 
35' 
Supreme Court and controversy over it would seem to be 
at an end. The North Carolina law of 1929 is now on 
the docket of the same court and will probably be 
argued at the opening of the October 1931 term. The 
1929 Georgia law was declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court of Georgia on February 12, 1931. Neither 
the law of North Carolina nor that of Georgia is similar 
to the Indiana law and I cannot see where the decision 
on the later law will be applicable to the first two. 
The Georgia and North Carolina laws each grant complete 
exemption from the tax to the independent merchant, 
although the two disagree upon who is an independent, 
while the Indiana law taxes every store. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court made a rather fine distinction in 
explaining the difference between the statute of 1927 
and that of 1929, and it will be of interest to note 
whether this distinction oan be seen by the United5Statee 
Supreme Court or not. 
Anti-Chain Store Law of 1930. 
South Carolina. The South Caroli11a law of 1930 bears 
Law of 1930. little similarity to the one enacted by 
the legislature of that state in 1928. It is, ho~ever, 
very much like the 1929 Indiana law. The 1930 act makes 
no attempt to classify owners of stores as chain store 
operators,or independents,· but strikes at the chain store 
through a progressive license tax, graduated as to the 
number of stores owned------by a single management. The law 
is ae follows: 
"Every person, firm.or corporation or association 
engaged in. the business of operating or maintaining in 
this state under the same general management, supervision, 
or ownership one or more stores or mercantile establish-
ments where goods, wares and/or merchandise are offered 
for sale ·at retail, shall pay an annual license tax, in 
addition to all other license fees or charges, for each 
store or mercantile.establishment situate in any 
incorporated city and/or town in this State, in accord-
ance with the following schedule: 














Thirtieth store 15'0.00 
For each store,in exeess of thirty stores, an annual 
tax of one hundred and fifty ($ 150.00) dollars for 
each store: Provided, That the tax herein imposed shall 
not apply to gasoline filling stations."34 
34. As taken from a copy of this act sent-me by the 
South Carolina Tax Commission. 
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"On July 18, 1930 an inte~locutory injui1ction against 
the enforcement of the 1930 South Carolina chain store 
tax law was granted by the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina in the 
case of Southern Grocery Stores v. South Carolina Tax 
Commission. The appeal from this decision is h~~d in 
abeyance pending the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in the Indiana chain store case. 0 35 In 
answer to an inquiry regarding the present status of 
this 1aw, the South Carolina Tax Commission, on 
October 28, 1930, said, "We wish to state that this la.w 
has been in litigation since its enactment and we have 
collected only$ i;.oo on same.n36 This law is so 
much like the Indiana law in its provisions that it 
would seem sure of being upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court. The graduation in the scale of fees is 
more rapid and continues farther than does the one in 
the Indiana law but in view of the decision on that law, 
this would not appear to be a bar to validity. A test 
of the law in the Supreme Court will show whether a 
limit 11rill be set as a maximum on a graduated scale of 
fees. 
35. E. w. Simms, Legal Department, National Chain Store 
Association. 
36. ~. A. S~livan Jr., Assistant Director South Carolina 
Tax Commission, License Tax Division. Ootober 28,1930. 
Final. Disposition of the License 
Tax Type of Anti-Chain Store Law. 
States Have Failed Beginning with 1927 and running 
to Enforce Laws. through 1930, each year has seen 
the enactment of some law designed -to fix a license tax 
on chain store operators and at the sar4e time, exempt 
the independent merchant from the tax. In 1927, North 
Carolina, Georgia, and Maryland passed such laws; in 
1928, South Carolina produced the only law of this type; 
in 1929, Georgia and North Carolina passed their second 
such act, and Indiana joined these two with a law to 
curb the chains. The year 1930 found South Carolina 
making her second attempt to place a heavier license 
tax on the chains than was placed on the independents, 
by the passage of her second anti-chain store law. The 
laws of 1927 and 1928 are definitely out of the picture 
as a result of adverse judicial decisions. Three of 
the laws of 1929 and 1930 are now before the courts for 
decision as to constitutionality, and no revenue is 
being realized from any of them. The 1929 Georgia law 
was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of 
Georgia. The 1929 North Carolina law has been upheld 
by the Supreme Court of that state and is now before the 
United States Supreme Court tor final disposition. PJt 
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injunction has been granted against the enforcement of 
the 1930 South Carolina law and further action has been 
d~layed, pending the decision of the Supreme Court in 
the Indiana case. This law now seems to be in a very 
favorable position as regards constitutionality. The 
Indiana. law of 1929 stands alone among this type of law 
as having, received the approval of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
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Grose Sales Tax Laws as. a 
Curb to Chain Stores. 
The Reasons tor a ~he difficulty encountered in 
Q.fose Sales Tax. . framing a license tax which would 
apply only to chain stores and yet would stand under 
test in the courts, has caused legislators to turn to 
the g:oss sales tax as a.n anti-chain store weapon. 
Thisc type of law is to11nd in many different forms and 
in varying degrees of severity. Eight states now have 
such laws on their statute books, three of which can be 
classed as anti-chain. Such laws are now being tested 
in the courts of Mississippi and Kentuoky,and should 
these laws stand, there is little doubt but that this 
type of legislation will become even more popular. In 
addition to the regulatory feature of these gross sales 
taxes, the fact cannot be overlooked that they are 
very efficient in the raising of revenue in a way that 
is not noticed by the voting public. 
Grose Sa.lee Tax 
Jaaw of Georsia. 
provides for a 
The legislature of Georgia has enact-
ed a gross sales tax law which 
I 
"tax upon the business of selling any 
tangible property, real or personal, at the rate of 2 
mills on the dollar or $ 2 per $ 1,000 of gross 
receipts.-" 37 
37. Georgia Laws of 1929. Page 106. 
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T~~ tax for wholesa..lers is one mill per dollar which, 
added to the retail tax, makes three mills per doll.ar. 
A deduction of thirty thousand dollars is allowed from 
the total gross receipts before the tax is computed, 
but. according to the instructions provided by the 
State Tax Commissioner, only one elaim for exemption 
may be granted a taxpayer, regardless of the number of 
his stores. This provision definitely classes the law 
as anti-chain store. 
Gross Sales Tax The Kentucky gross sales tax law 
Law of Kentucky. attacks the chain store in a some-
~at different manner from that employed by the Georgia 
law. This law, after defining the 111ords "retail mer-
chant" and providing for the exemption of "those 
actually engaged in gardening OT farming and selling 
garden or farm products raised by them in thli.s State", 
says: 
"Every reta .. il merchant, as defined herein, shall pay an 
annual lioense tax for the opening, establishing, oper-
ating or maintaining of any store or stores, as defined 
herein, determined by oomputing the tax on the amount 
of gross sales as follows: 
One-twentieth of one per cent of the gross sales of 
Four hundred thousand ($ 400,000.00) Dollars or less; 
two-twentieths of one per cent on the excess of the 
gross sales over Four hundred thousand ($ 400,000.00) 
Dollars and not exceeding Five hundred thousand 
($ 500,000.00) Dollars; five-twentieths of one per oent 
on the excess of the gross sales over Five hundred 
thousand ($ 500,000.00) Dollars and not exceeding Six 
hundred thousand ($ 600,000.00) Dollars; eight-twentieths 
of one per cent on the excess of the gross sales over 
Six hundred thousand. ($ 600,000.00) Dollars and not 
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exceeding Seven hundred thousand ($ 700,000.00) Dollars; 
eleven-twentieths of one per cent on the excess of the 
gross sales over Seven hundred thousand ($ 700,000.00) 
and not exceeding Eight hundred thousand ($ 800,000.00) 
Dollars; fourteen-twentieths of on~ per cent of the 
excess of the gross sales over Eight hwidred thousand 
($ 800,000.00) Dollars and not exceeding Nine hundred 
thousand ($ 900,000.00) Dollars; seventeen-twentieths 
of one _per cent on the excess of the gross sales over 
Nine hundred thousand ($ 900,000.00) Dollars and not 
exceeding One million ($ 1,000,000.00) Dollars; one per 
aent on the excess of the gross sales over One million 
($ 1,000,000.00) Dollars."'~ 
The anti-chain feature of this law is easily seen when , 
it is considered that a.n organization having sales of 
one hundred thousand dollars will pay only fifty 
dollars tax, while an organization having sales of one 
million dollars, or ten times that of the smaller con-
cern, will pay a tax of three thousand and fifty dollars 
or sixty-one times as much a1; the tax on the smaller 
organization. The tax on the second million dollars of 
sales will be ten thousand dollars which rate will be 
twenty times as high as the tax paid by the concern 
with sales of less than four hundred thousand dollars. 
Some idea of the amount of revenue that might be raised 
under this law can be gained when it is considered that 
the Great Atl.an~io and Paoifio Tea Company has sales of 
sixteen million dollars annually in Kentucky while 
Kroeger Baking Compe.:ny1 s sales amount to fourteen 
million dollars annually in that state.39 
38. Kentucky Acts 1930. Page 476. 
39. The Nation. 130:,44-5, May 7, 1930. 
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Kroeger Baking Company a.nd the J. c. Penney Company 
have asked that the State Tax Commission be.restrained 
from collecting this tax. "Arguments were made as to 
the validity of the law before a Three Judges Federal 
Court at Frankfort,·Kentuoky, February 14, 1931. The 
order was for a temporary injunction restraining the 
State Tax Commission from oolleoting said tax. About 
forty firius a.re now protected by the restraining order 
issued at the February Court. 0 40 
The Mississil?ll! The Mississippi law levies a tax of 
}?ri vilese Tax. one quarter of one per oent on the 
gross inoome of those "who sell any tangible property 
whatsoever, real or personal. 11 Wholesalers are required 
to pay one-eighth of on.e per oent on gross inoome. 
This law then goes on to make itself anti-chain, and to 
very probably make itself unoonst~tutional by saying: 
"Upon every person operating more than five stores in 
this state, at whioh goods are sold at retail, there is 
levied an additional tax equivalent of one quarter of 
one per cent of the gross income of all such stores." 
A te~porary injW'lotion was issued against the enforce-
ment of this law by decree of three Federal Judges 
acting upon the petition of the J. c. Penney Company.41 
"A lower oourt had already deolared it unconstitutional 
beoause of its inclusion of a clause which provides for 
40. James W. Cammack, Attorney-General of Kentucky. 
, March 31> 1931. 
41. The ~usiness Week, October 8, 1930. Page 12. 
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the imprisonment of those who fail to pay the tax."42 
The appeal from the United States District Court of 
Mississippi holding the law to be unconstitutional is 
now on the docket of the United States Supreme Court 
for argument and will probably be heard at the ppen-
ing of the October 1931 term.~3 
42. Chain Store Age, November 1930. Page 29. 
43. E. w. Simms Legal Department, National Chain Store 
' · Association. 
Attempted Anti-Chain Store Legislation. 
Early Attempts Prior to 1927, very few attempts to curb 
.at Lesi slatio:g.. chain stores by legislation had been 
made. No anti-chain store law had been enacted up to 
that date, and little attention had been paid to the 
subject. The anti-chain store forces had, however, 
become powerful enough by 1927 to secure the introduo-
t'ion of some twenty-one anti-chain bills in the various 
state legislatures, and to succeed in causing five of 
these bills to be enacted into laws. Cha.in Store Age 
says, in speaking of legislative action during the year: 
"Eighteen state assemblies considered anti-cha.in meas-
ures, yet suoh laws actually passed in but fou; ... 44 In 
making this statement,. Cha.in ~tore Age is not consider-
ing. the 1927 Michigan Act as an anti-chain store act 
while I have classified it as such. The 1927 group of 
bills forms the foundation on which much of the later 
legislative action along this line was built. Due to 
the fact that only about one third of the state legis-
lative bodies meet in the even numbered years, 1928 did 
not produce a great many bills of an anti-chain nature. 
Virginia, Mississippi, Rhode I.eland, Kentucky, and 
South Carolina were among the states whose legislatures 
44. Chai:n Store Age. June 1927. Page 56. 
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considered anti-chain store bills but South Carolina was 
the only state· to enact one of these bills into law in 
1928. The Virginia Hou~e passed an anti-chain store 
bill4' but this bill was killed by the Senate. Section 
l of this bill was as follows: 
n:se it enacted by the General Assembly or· Virginia, 
That every person, firm, or corporation, engaged in the 
business of a merchant and operating, directly or indirect-
ly, more than five stores in this state shall, in 
addition to the license imposed by l~w on merchants 
baaed on purchases, pay for each store in excess of 
five, the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars per 
year for each store so operated, the said sum to be 
assessed by the commissioner of revenue, and paid to 
the treasurer at the time, now or hereafter provided by 
law :for the payment of merchants licenses in this State." 
Section 3, of this bill was as follows: 
"This act shall not apply to persons, firms, companies 
or corporations engaged in the sale of gasoline, motor 
oils and kindred fuels when not sold in grocery stores 
,or stores of like character. The tax on motor vehicle 
fuels imposed by law shall be in lieu of the licenses 
fixed by this act." 
The Kentucky House passed a bi1146 which would have 
imposed a license fee of two hundred and fifty dollars 
per annum on each unit operated in excess of five. 
This bill was never acted upon by the Senate. The 
Kentucky legislature also considered a b11147 which 
would have required that all drug stores and pharmacies 
be owned by registered pharm.acists. The Rhode Islar1d 
45. Virginia House :Bill No.· 352. 1928. 
46. Kentucky House Bill No. 596. 1928. 
47. Kentucky House Bill No. 486. 1928. 
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legislature of 1928 considered a b11148 which would 
have taxed each unit of a chain of five or more stores 
the sum of five hundred dollars per annum. A bi1149 
before the Mississippi legislature of 1928 would have 
changed the usual base for determining a tax on chain 
stores by assessing a tax 
"in the :following amounts, 
to wit: Where such person, firm or corporatio~ is doing 
business in three or more municipalities in this State 
for each municipality in excess of two, the sum of $ 500". 
This bill considered two or more stores under the same 
management as a chain. 
Action by United Agitation for legislative action had 
§.tates Congress, reached such a point by 1928 that a 
resolution50 was approved by the United States Senate 
on May 3, 1928, by which the Federal Trade Commission 
was directed to "undertake an inquiry into the ohain 
store system of marketi~g and distribution as conducted 
by manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing or other types 
of-ohain stores to ascertain· and report to the Senate 
( l.) the extent to which such oonsol_~dations have been 
effected in violation of the anti-trust laws, if at all; 
(2) the extent to which consolidations of such organi-
zations are susceptible to regulatian under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act or anti-trust laws, if at all; 
48.' Rhode Island. Senate :Sill No •. 25. 1_928. 
49. Mississippi House :Sill No. 235. 1928. 
50. United States Senate Resolution No. 224. May 3, 1928. 
and (3) what legislation should be enacted for the 
purpose of regulating a.nd controlling.chain store 
distribution." 5'1 
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Lesislative Action Anti-ohain store legislation was 
~n 1229. given a prominent part on the 
program in many of the state legislatures of 1929. 
Sixty-three bills were introduced in the various states 
with sixty meeting defeat.52 Listed with the states 
actively engaged in trying to check chain store growth, 
or at least to realize a substantial revenue from this 
growth in 1929, we find Missouri, Ohio, Minnesota, 
Texas, I-llinois, Maryland, Tennessee, Vermont, Wiscon-
sin, West Virginia, Iowa, New York, Indiana, Georgia, 
a.nd North Carolina. Of the bills introduced in the 
1929 legislatures of these states, only those of the 
last three became laws. The ratio of laws enacted to 
bills introduced became smaller in 1929 than it was in 
1927, but the actual nwnber of bills introduced 
t 
increased three times over. This is an interesting 
feature of such legislation, and indicates that while 
more individual legislators were active in the sponsor-
ing of suoh bills, the legislative bodies, as such, 
were becoming more conservative in their attitude 
toward such bills. When the 1927 bills were introduced, 
5'1. United States Daily. May 7, 1928. 
52. Chain Store Age. January 1930. 
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probably only a small percentage of the members of the 
various state legislatures gave any thought to the 
constitutionality of these laws when enacted. With 
adverse court decisions standing against the 1927 laws, 
many legislators began to question the possibility of 
framing a law that would stand when attacked. It would 
seem that the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
on the Indiana law, together with further decisions 
which should be handed down in the near future on the 
anti-chain store laws before that Court, should clarify 
the situation to such an extent that the volume of bills 
introduced will be diminished. Legislators will have 
something definite to copy in drawing bills of this 
nature instead of merely going by guess as they have in 
·the past. A significant feature of the 1929 legislative 
agitation was the inclusion of many of the middle-west-
ern states in the list of those who considered anti-
ohain store bills. Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois 
were especially active along this line with at least 
four anti-chain bills making their appearance in the 
legislatures of each of these states. Missouri, Texas, 
Indiana, and Iowa also joined the ranks of the agita-
tors for this type of le$islation~ and while it would 
not be correct to say the scene had shifted to this 
section, we certainly can say there has been a spread 
to. these states. Some of the most radical anti-chain 
store bills as yet produced were considered in the 
legislatures of these middle-western states in 1929. 
~he Missouri license tax bill53 of 1929 prescribed a 
graduated license tax which, if passed and upheld, 
would ha.ve beell not only regulatory, but prohibitive. 
The apparent aim of this bill was the disbarment from 
the state of chains of stores with more then four units. 
The schedule of license fees was as follows: 
"Seo. 4. The fees for licenses for storekeepers 





For one location in the state 
For a second location in the state 
For a third location in the state 
For a fourth location in the state 
1o~ a fifth location in the state 
For a sixth location in the state 
For a seventh location in-the state 






The Wisconsin Assembly considered a bi115'4 in 1929, 
which was meant to be a definite check on chain store 
growth in that state. ~his bill combined a gross sales 
tax with a unit license tax, and made.both applicable 
only to chains of five or more stores. Section l of this 
bill, was as follows: 
"Section l. Two new sections are added to the statutes 
to read: 71;28 (1) There shall be assessed, levied and 
collected from every person, firm or corporation owning 
or operating, within this state, five or more retail 
stores or mercantile establishments selling or dispensing 
5'3. Missouri House ~ill No. 744 and Senate Bill No. 710. 
1929. 
,4. Wisoonsin Assembly Bill No. 258. 1929. 
groceries, meats, bakery products, fruits and vegetables, 
hardware, automobile supplies, furniture, dry goods, 
tobacco and cigars, or drugs, a tax equal to five per 
cent of the gross receipts of each such store." 
The-bill read as follows in Section 2, Paragraph 3: 
"The annual license fee shall be five hundred dollars 
for each such establishment. If the lieense is issued 
subsequent to July first in any year the fee for the 




In ~930, those legislatures whieh 
did not convene in 1929 had a 
< 
chance to consider anti-chain store legislation.: Chain 
Store Age for July 1930 says: "Of the eighteen state 
legislatures in session this year, eight have prod,uoed 
nineteen anti-chain store bills, of which four became 
law.n55 Here we find Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Georgia, Kentucky, and South Carolina as the center of 
the agitation, with the last four of these passing laws 
which were designed to be damaging to chain store 
interests. Three of these laws were gross sales tax 
laws and in this, we again see an attempt by the anti-
ohain store interests to find a type of law that will 
be upheld by the courts and yet will fulfill the desire 
for regulation. An idea as to the aim of the Texas 
Legislature in 1930, can be gained by considering the 
55. Chain Store Age. July 1930. Page 44. 
tit.le to a bi1156 introduced the House o:f that state. 
This title was as· follows: 
"An Act: To check monopolistic ·ten4enoies, to promote 
the general welfare of the state and the security of the 
economic welfare of the state, by the levy and collect-
ion of an annual license tax upon every person, firm or 
corporation engaged in the business of operating or 
maintaining in this state, under the same general 
management, supervision or ownership, one or more stores 
or mercantile establishments, where goods, wares and 
merchandise is offere4 :for sale at retail." 
The bill under this title'would_have assessed a gradu-
ated license tax on stores. The tax would have amounted 
to three dollars on the first store and would have 
progressed to five hundred dollars on each store in 
excess of twenty-four. 
Legislative Action It has been :impossible to determine 
in 1931. much about legislative action 
along the anti-chain store line for the year 1931 as 
the records of the proceedings of the sta.te legislatures 
for the present year are, as a rule, not yet available. 
Chain store Age for March 1931, says: "Anti-ohain 
bills are before the legislatures of twenty one states~57 
Listed in this group are Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
Vermont, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, 
Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Georgia, West 
Virginia, Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, Texas, Colorado, 
56. Texas House Bill No. 14. 1930. 
57. Chain Store Age. March 193~. 
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Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington. Sinee the 
issue of this copy of Cha.in store Age, I have receive~ 
copies of two bills which were introduced in the 1931 
Ohio Legislature. "To date no anti chain store laws 
/ 
have been enacted by any of the legjslatures at their 
1931 sessions, although the legislatures of 'Minnesota 
and Oregon adopted Resolutions for investigation of 
the chain store system."58 
58. E. w. S~s. Legal Department, National Chain Store 
Association. May 6, 1931. 
Provisions of the ~ills. 
Provisions of the Bills introduced in the legislatures 
Bills Varied. of the various states during the 
period from 1927 to 1931 have provided for the assess-
ment of taxes against chain stores in almost every 
conceivable manner. Many of these bills provided for 
a flat license tax on stores; others provided for a. 
graduated gross sales tax, or a gross sales tax 
applicable only to chain stores. Other bills featured 
a combination of both the license tax and the gross 
sales tax while a few would make possible the absolute 
exclusion of the chain stores. The most popular type 
of proposed legislation on this subject has been in the 
shape of a straight license tax on each unit of the· 
chain organization. The amount of this fee varied in 
the proposed legislation within rather wide limits. The 
most oomm.~n amounts demanded were fifty dollars, one 
hundred dollar~, two hundred fifty dollars, and five 
hundred dollars for each unit of the ohain, or, in some 
insta.noes, for each unit in excess of one, two, three, 
four, or five stores. A bi1159 proposed i~he Illinois 
legislature of 1929, ~owever, called for a license tee 
of five thousand dollars for each store in excess of 
59. Illinois House Bill No. 574. 1929. 
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three, and the 1929 Missouri legislature rejected a 
b1ll6o with a scale of license fees graduated up , with 
the number of units in.the chain as the deciding factor, 
from five dollars on the first store to ten thousand 
dollars for each store in excess of seven. The 1929 
Ohio bi116l assessed a license fee on all retail and 
wholesale stores, "said fee to be based upon and 
determined by the annual volume of business transacted 
in each store and the number of stores operated." 
This fee ranged from five dollars as a minimum to. forty 
dollars as a maximum on the business with only one 
unit to as high as seven hundred fifty dollars per 
unit on a business with more than five unite. 
Various Sales 
Tax :Bills. 
Various types of gross sales tax bills 
are found among the proposed legislation. 
Here again, we find a wide range of difference as to the 
severity of the tax. The West Virginia Senate consid-
ered a bi1162 in 1929 which called for a tax of three-
fourths of one per cent of gross sales where ten or 
more stores are operated. This bill was unusually 
lenient both in the am.ount of the te..x and in the divid-
ing point between those who would escape and those who 
would pay. 
60. Missouri House Bill No. 744.1929. 
61. Ohio House Eill No. 340. 1929. 
62. West Virginia Senate Bill lTo. 179· J.929. 
.The New York Senate considered a bi1163 in the same 
,, ' 
year which was far more drastic in its provisions. 
Thi.s bill would have imposed a tax on corporations 
operating two or more stores, as follows: Two per cent 
on gross sales of lese than fifty thousand dollars, 
four per cent on gross sales from fifty thousand 
dollars to one hundred thousand dollars, six per cent 
on gross sales from one hundred thousand dollars to 
two hundred thousand dollars, and eight per cent on 
gross sales of .more than two hundred thousand dollare.64 
A Vermont House b11165 provided for a tax of five per 
cent on gross sales with a deduction allowed of the 
first four hundred thousand dollars of sales and so much 
of such sales "as represent the products of the forest, 
fields, mines, quarries and factories within the state~66 
These last two bills are very good illustrations of the 
two types of gross sales tax legislation proposed by 
anti-chain store factions. 
Combined License and Minnesota and Wisconsin combin-
Sal es Tax :Sills,~ ed the idea of a license fee 
with that of a gross sales tax in some of their 1929 
bills. The Wisconsin legislature considered a bi1167 
- 63. New York Senate.Bill No. 1644. 1929. 
66. Chain Store Age. March 1929, Page 84. 
64. Cha.in Store Age. April 1929, Page 56. 
65. Vermont House Dill.No. 45. 1929. 
67. Wisconsin House Bill No. 258. 1929. 
which provided for a five hundred dollar license fee 
for eaoh establishment where five or more stores· were 
under the same management and added to this a gross 
sales tax of five per cent on the sales of the same 
stores. The 1929 Minnesota legislature withstood a 
veritable barrage of bill.a patterned along this line, 
and combining a license tax with a gross sales tax. 
57 
One of these bills68 provided for a license tax of 
twenty five dollars on the first unit of an organization, 
fifty dollars each on the next four, one hundred 
dollars each on the next five, one hundred fifty 
dollars each on the next ten, and two hundred dollars 
eaoh on all over twenty. This bill then demanded, in 
addition to the license fee, a gross sales tax amount-
ing to one ha1f of one per cent on the first five 
thousand dollars of sales,one per cent on the next five 
thousand dollars, one and a llialf per cent on the next 
fifteen thousand dollars, two per cent on the next 
twenty five thousand dollars, and three per cent on all 
over fifty thousand dollars. Another similar bi1169 
provided for a license tax running from twenty five 
dollars eaoh on the first four stores to two hundred 
dollars each on all over twenty stores, and with a gross 
68. Minnesota House Eill No. 305. 1929. 
69. Minnesota House Bill No. 773. 1929. 
sales tax added ranging from one-fifth of one per cent 
on sales up to two hundred fifty thousand dollars, to 
three per cent on sales of over two millions of 
dollars. A bi1170 introduced in the Minnesota Senate 
contained the same sea.le of license fees as did. ~he 
~iret of these two Minnesota House bills but was more 
lenient in the matter of the gross sales tax on the 
lower levels of sales. 
Various Restrictions A considerable number of bills 
Proposed in Eills. with various proposals for 
restriction are .found among those which have been in-
troduced. A majority of these bills made their 
appearances in 1929. A bi1171 was introduced in the 
1928 Kentucky legislature- with a view to restricting 
the growth of drug chains. This bill was patterned 
after the Pennsylvania anti-chain drug store law of 
1927. A bi1172 introduced in the 1929 Wisconsin legis-
lature, provided that "any person, firm, or corporation 
desiring to engage in retail t~ade of any kind, shall 
~-, 
make application to the commissioner of banking for 
each location at which such business is conducted". 
The bill further provides that the commissioner of 
banking should pass upon the general desirability of 
having such a business established and should disapprove 
70. Minnesota Senate Eill No. 37'· 1929. 
71. Kentucky House :Bill No. 486. l.928. 
72. Wisconsin Assembly Bill No. 133. 1929. 
the application for license if he believed that there 
was no justification for the organization of the busi-
ness. A board of review was provided to which the 
decis~on of the commissioner of banking could be appeal~ 
ed. Thie board would oonsiet of the governor, the 
secretary of state, and the attorney-general. Mr. Pahl, 
the author of this bill. apparently had great faith in 
the ability of the officers named in the bill to deter-
mine what particular business enterprise was justifiable 
in any certain part of the state. 
Anti-Chain Aotivitz Texas showed a great deal of 
in Texas. activity along the line of attempt-
ed anti-chain store legislation in the 1929 and 1930 
sessions of the legislature of that state. Both 
license tax and gross sales tax laws were .proposed. A 
1929 House b11173 provided for a license fee of one 
thousand dollars for each store of a chain of three or 
more stores, and made possible the assessing of half 
of this amount in addition, by both county and city, 
which provision would have doubled the tax. Two bills74 
of the called sessions of 1930 proposed a graduated 
license ta.x starting at three dollars for one store and 
increasing to five hundred dollars each on all stores 
in excess of twenty four. 
_ 73. Texas House Bill No. 601. 1929. 
74. Texas House Eills Bos. 14 and 57. 1930. 
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Another bi1175 of the fourth called session of 1930 
provided for a gross sa~es tax of two ~er cent on the 
sales of organizations with more than five stores. 
Ohio :Sills 
!Jf 1931_. 
The 1931 Ohio legislature considered a 
bill76 which would require firme dealing 
in cigarettes to pay a license tax, the amount of which 
depended upon the number of branches conducted by one 
management. This fee was gr~duated from one dollar for 
the single unit, to :five hundred dollars for a store 
whioh was a part of a chain of more than ten stores. 
Another bi1177 considered by thls;:'legielature required 
a license fee of fifty dollars per store on all unite 
from the second to the :f'if th, and a fee of one hundred 
dollars for each store in excess of five. 
75. Texas House Eill No. 73. Fourth Called Session. 1930. 
76. Ohio House :Sill No. 3l.3. 1931. 
77. Ohio House Eill No. 540. 1931. 
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The 1931 Kansas Eill. 
The Kansas :Bi,11 An anti-chain store b11178 was intro-
as Presented. duoed in the 1931 Kansas legislature 
by Mr. Baird, of Coffey County. This bill provided: 
"Every person, firm, or corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of operating or maintaining in this state, under 
the same general management, supervision, or ownership, 
two or more stores or mercantile establishments where 
goods, wares, or merchandise is sold or offered for 
sale at retail shall be deemed a branch or chain store· 
operator, and shall apply for and obtain from the 
secretary of state, an annual license for the privilege 
of engaging in the business of operating a branch or 
chain store, and shall pay for such license fifty 
dollars ($ 50) on each and every such store operated in 
the state in excess of one. Counties shall not levy a 
license tax on the business taxed wider this section, 
but cities and towns may levy a license tax not in 
excess of the tax levied by the state." 
This bill was referred to the committee on State Affairs 
and was reported out favorably·by tha.t committee. The 
bill then passed the House of Representatives with but 
three dissenting votes and was eent to the Senate. The 
bill was here referred to the committee on State and 
Federal Affairs. By this time the bill was causing 
some comment in the newspapers,and the general meroband-
ising public was becoming interested in the meaning and 
intent of the proposed legislation. The Senate commit-
tee was being swamped with letters and telegrams from 
the owners of selling organizations who maintained from 
78. Ka.nsae House Bill No. 360. 1931. 
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two to ten units each. As a result of this activity 
on the part of the merchants of the state, t'~e Senate 
comm.ittee called an open meeting to be held for the 
purpose of di-scussing the bill. This meeting was held 
in the Supreme Court room at Topeka, Kansas, on 
Thursday evening, February 26, 1931. Senator Geddes of 
Butler County, chairman of the committee, presided over 
the meeting. 
Representative Eaird, the author of the bill, presented 
his arguments for the passage of the bill and was 
questioned by members of the Senate committee. ~r. 
Baird believed that a law, such as he proposed, would 
tend to discourage the spread of chain store growth in 
Kansas and he believed that such growth should be 
checked. He estimated that this bil_l, if passed, would 
bring in approximately seven hundred and fifty thousand 
dollars annually in taxes, but he believed the regula-
1 
tory feature to be the important property of this type 
of legislation. Mr. Baird said his intention had been 
to tax the big chain store organizations owned by 
foreign corporations and that t~e bill had not been 
aimed at small operators, al~hough it would certainly 
affect some of this class. He said that he had not 
anticipated that this bill would tax filling stations 
but that he now believed they would also tall within the 
list of those taxed. He believed that the fifty dollar 
63 
tax would be high enough to handicap the big operator 
and at the same time would not seriously injure the 
owner of the small chain. When questioned by Senator 
Geddes as to the effect of this tax on the consumer, 
Mr. Baird said he believed the revenue raised in this 
manner would relieve taxation on other sources enough to 
offset any burden on the buying public. 
The opponents of the bill were then given the floor and 
·it was soon apparent that the bill was being fought by 
the small chains of the state. No representative of 
the national chains took any part in the discussion and 
the largest chain represented was the Duckwall Stores, 
whose speaker described them as a Kansas owned and 
operated corporation with thirty-two units. Included in 
the list of those who spoke against the bill were the 
:followin~: 
A. c. Carpenter, President of the Kansas Oil Men's 
Association. 
w. o. Gregg of the Duckwall Stores. 
R. R. Jackson of Bowersock Grain and Elevator Co. 
Clayton Cline of the Beatrice Creamery Company. 
Glenn Holm of the Glenn Holm Stores. 
A. w. Adt, Automobile Dealers of Kansas City, Kansas. 
E. E. Wood, Secreta+y, Southwest Lumbermen's Ass•n. 
One of the most forceful arguments as to the economic 
undesirability of suoh a law as the one being discussed 
was presented by a representative of the Seymour Packing 
Company, a Kansas owned and operated organi~ation. This 
Company is primarily a buying organization which handles 
produce. They buy :from the farmers through scattered 
64 
outlying stations of small size. Many of these small 
stations are not self supporting merely as a purchasing. 
unit and a few lines of feeds and other produce-raisers' 
necessities are being sold from these stations in order 
to aid in the overhead of the station. About three 
hundred such stations are operated by this company an~ 
should this anti-chain bill become a law, a tax burden 
of about fifteen thousand dollars would be added. This 
burden would mean the closing of a majority of these 
stations with the consequent destruction of the market-
ing facilities. 
In speaking for the lumber industry in Kansas, Mr. 
Wood said there were one thousand and fifty.six retail 
lum.ber yards in Kansae, of which sixty per cent were 
members of the southwes.t Lumbermen' s Association. He 
said six hundred thirty seven yards, owned by ninety-
two firms, would be reached by this tax. Mr. Wood then 
introduced the managers of six small lumber chains 
located in various parts of Kansas. These men were from 
Waterville, Ottawa, Chapman, Wichita, Hiawatha, and 
Ashland. Mr. Fred Eronson, manager of the Rock Island 
Lumber Company, with headquarters in Wichita, said there 
were three hundred yards owned by the fifteen line yard 
companies in Wichita. He said that many of these yards 
could not be operated by independents as the margin of 
profit would be too small. This was evidenced by the 
6; 
fact that six of his yards had made a smaller net 
profit in the last year than fifty dol~ars, the amount 
of this tax. As mentioned before, no representative of 
the ]'ational chains took any part in the discussion 
and it was charged by several of the speakers that the 
~ 
national chains would be glad to see the bill become 
law, as it would affect the small operator much more 
seriously than it would the big_ chains. This charge 
was refuted to some extent by the def enders of the bill 
when they showed(that)that the 1929 North Carolina law, 
which was worded almost identically as was the Kansas 
bill, had been attacked in the courts by nineteen of the 
big national chains. I believe the bill, if enacted 
into law, would have distressed small operators who are 
practically on the margin, to a greater extent than it 
would have hurt the national chains, yet I do not 
believe the national chains wou~d have desired the 
passage of such an act, and I am confiden~ the big 
chains would have immediately moved against such a law 
in court. The foes of the bill presented far the best 
argument and the bill was killed by the Senate committee. 
The situation in Kansas is, no doubt, rather typical of 
the situation in general so far as chain stores are 
concerned. 
Various Phases of the Subject. 
What is a 
Cha.in Stare. 
One of' the mo st conf'usi11g situations 
fo'Ulld among the legislators is the 
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fact that there is no agreement as to what conditions 
are necessary before a store becomes a unit of' a chain 
system. Certain numbers have been picked upon by the 
lawmakers of the various states as representing their 
ideas of the number of units required to constitute a 
chain. There seems, however, to have been no basic 
facts on which to make these choices. Practically all 
seem agreed that six stores constitute a chain but 
there is little agreement as to whether six stores are 
necessary before a system becomes a chain. Three 
stores, five stores, and all over five stores, are 
definitions of' a chain commonly found in proposed legis-
lation. The North Carolina law which is now before the 
United Sta~tee Supreme Court, and the Kansas bill of 
1931 used two or more stores as their concept of a 
chain. There is a hope among the anti-chain forces that 
this classification will be found to be constitutional 
on the ground that a privilege is granted in allowing 
one management to conduct more than one store. If a 
chain can be defined, I think it must be on this last 
basis, and in classifying stores as chain or independent 1 
we must count all with two or more places of business 
as chains. However, when this division is made, we will 
find that many who are now most highly interested in 
fighting so-called chains will discover themselves as 
coming under that category. This was demonstrated 
very pointedly in the consideration of the 1931 Kansas 
bill when the owners of a few stores fought bitterly 
against being classed as chain store owners and to 
being given the same treatment as was given the 
national chains such as the Great Atlantic and Pacific 
Tea Company, and Kress Stores. The legislature of 
Georgia became so confused on this subject in their 1929 
law that they classified as chains, organizations with 
more than five units and then in another part of the 
act, made the tax applicable to the owner of only five 
~tores. This discrepenoy in the law as passed was the 
cause of a suit to determine the meaning of the law. 
For What Reasons are There are three reasons for the 
Bills Introduced. promotion of legislation of an 
------...-~------......... -
anti-chain store type. The first reason is the desire 
I 
to raise revenue. Legislative bodies are oaeting about 
for a method of raising revenue which will produce 
results a.nd at the same time fail to antagonize the 
voting public. There is no doubt that huge sums could 
be raised with levies euoh as have been proposed in 
many of the anti-chain store bills and yet the public 
would not resent the collection ot the tax as they 
would if it fell directly on them and in a lump sum. 
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The backers of the 1931 Kansas bill estimated that this 
law would produce three quarters of a million dollars 
annually if put into effect. This bill placed the 
license tax at fifty dollars on the unit and it oan be 
readily seen that should this amount be increased to 
two hundred fifty or to five hundred dollars per store, 
the revenue raised would mount up rapidly. The second 
reason for suoh legislative action, and the one I 
believe to be behind most of the proposed bills, is a 
desire by the authors of these bills to curb chain 
store.growth in the belief that this will aid the inde-
pendent merchant. ~hese men_are sincere in their desire 
to eliminate what they believe to be a menace to 
individual enterprise. · ~ome of them vision with horror 
the day when everything will be o'm.ed by chains and 
everybody will be working for someone else. There is 
a third reason for the proposal of this type of legis-
lation and as I examine many of the bills proposed, I 
believe this is a rather powerful reason. This is the 
introduction of suoh bills for political reasons. I am 
inclined to think that the framers of many of these 
bills knew that such bills probably would not pass and 
that if they did become law, they could not possibly 
' 
stand the test of constitutionality. Some of these 
bills are so crude that they really show genius in the 
devising of documents with so many objectionable 
features and yet have something to wave in the air at 
a political meeting. In this case the state lawmaker 
feels no qualms of conscience as he knows he will hurt 
nobody in the long run except for the possible cost of 
litigation, and if it comes to that, the state and the 
chain store corporations will be the ones to foot the 
bill and again there is no reason for worry. 
What Ty;pe ~f Law 
is Constitutional. 
State legislatures have been 
given the power to classify for 
the purpose of taxation but the courts have held that 
this classification must be made upon some reasonable 
gro'linds and that it cannot be arbitrary and without any 
just basis. This position taken by the courts has 
been responsible for the failure of most of the anti-
chain laws to be enforceable. This situation is clearly 
outlined in the following portion of the decision in 
the test of the 1927 North Carolina anti-chain store 
law: 79 
"It will be observed from the authorities hereinbefore 
cited, that, while the power of General Assembly to 
ma.ke'olaesifieatione, for purposes of taxation, is 
recognized, both by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and by this Court, it is held by this Court 
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that such classification, when arbitrary, unreasonable 
and unjust, contravenes the provisions of Section 3 of 
Article 5 of the State Constitution, and by the 
Supreme Court of the United States that classifications 
subject to the same condemnation are in violation of 
the equal protection clause of Section l of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
states ... 79 
So long as this interpretation stands, I see no posai-
bili ty of a license tax which exempts ·the owner of one, 
two, three, or any other number of stores and taxes 
those owning stores in excess of this number, to with-
stand the assaults of litigation. The recent decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in the Indiana case 
assures the oonstitutionality of the graduated license 
tax when applied to all stores. There is a question in 
my mind as to how high this tax could run before it 
would be considered unreasonable. There will,no doubt, 
soon be a test of this point as the South Carolina law 
of 1930 contains a graduated scale of license tees 
from five dollars on the first store to one hundred 
fifty dollars on the thirtieth store. The gross sales 
tax can also be used as an anti-chain tax and there is 
no doubt but that a gross sales tax of flat am.cunt, with 
79. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Doughton, 
196 N. O. 145; 144 S. E. 701. 
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or without an exemption of certain minimum sales, is 
constitutional and enforceable. Tax experts are out-
spoken in oonder4ning such a tax but tax experts do not 
always succeed in impressing their opinions upon the 
lawmakers of the land. 
Who Fig1lts .Anti-Cha!!! The action of the Senate 
Stor_!!_ Legislation. oommi ttee of the 1931 Kansas 
legislature in calling an open meeting for the discus-
sion of the anti-chain store bill then before that 
committee, gave ample opportunity to study the forces 
aligned against this bill. As mentioned before, none 
of the national chain organizations took any part in 
this discussion, while ovmers of small groups of stores 
oame from all parts of the state to fight the bill. 
This would lead one to believe that the big cha.in 
organizations were not interested in the bill, or 
possibly desired to see its passage. I do not think 
this was the case. I believe the national chains are 
reluctant to take a hand in such lobbying because of the 
possibility that interest shown by them might influence 
public sentiment in favor of the bill. However, when 
such a bill -is enacted into law, the fight against this 
law is taken up by the national chains as is shown by 
the imposing array of such organizations aligned in the 
fight on the 1929 North Carolina law, after which the 
Kansas bill was patterned. 
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Conclusion. The misunderstandings and difficulties . , 
which have been encountered by anti-chain store legis-
- -
lation would seem to be cleared away by the decision 
of the -United States Supreme Court in the Indiana case. 
Final decisions on the North Carolina and Mississippi 
laws should serve even more to remove differences of 
interpretation. We cannot, however, be sure that a 
permanent condition of w1derstanding has been reached. 
Decisions of today may be influenced by many factors 
which may change in the future. Thie has been the 
history of judicial decisions as affecting the rail-
roads and may well be the case in the chain store field. 
The decision on the Indiana law was far from a unanimous 
one, and a change of even one member of the Supreme 
Court might change the policy of that Court. With this 
in mind, it is hardly possible to predict that the 
controversy over anti-chain store legislation is at 
an end. 
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